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Summary. This paper discusses the design of a novel multi-dimensional mechanism which
allows a principal to procure a single project or an item from multiple suppliers through a
two-step payment. The suppliers are capable of producing different qualities at costs which
cannot exceed a certain value and the mechanism balances between the costs faced by the
suppliers and the benefit the principal achieves from higher qualities. Iniatially, the principal
implements a standard second score auction and allocates the project to a single supplier based
its reported cost and quality, while then it elicits truthful reporting of the quality by issuing
a symmetric secondary payment after observing the winner’s production. We then provide an
alternate mechanism in which the principal issues an asymmetric secondary payment which
rewards agents for producing higher qualities, while it penalises them for producing lower
qualities than they reported. We prove that for both mechanisms truthful revelation of costs
and qualities is a dominant strategy (weakly for costs) and that they are immune to combined
misreporting of both qualities and costs. We also show that the mechanisms are individually
rational, and that the optimal payments received by the winners of the auctions are equal to
the payment issued by the standard second score auction.
1.1 Introduction
The appearance and effectively the dominance of the Internet in many everyday ac-
tivities has signaled a digital revolution which has thrown some considerable atten-
tion to auction mechanisms. Auctions are now playing an instrumental role in a vast
number of on-line activities, whether affecting them directly (e.g. on-line trading
sites such as ebay and taobao) or behind the scenes (e.g. on-line advertising). Tra-
ditional auction theory has been focusing on single-dimensional mechanisms which
usually allocate a product to a highest bidder or procure a service from the supplier
with the lowest cost.
1 This research is undertaken as part of the Danish Council on Strategic Research funded
project on Foundations of Electronic Markets (CFEM). This is a collaborative project
involving the Universities of Aarhus and Copenhagen, Copenhagen Business School,
The Alexandra Institute, DCCA and industrial partners: DONG Energy, Energinet.dk,
Inno:vasion, TradeExtension and Patrisia Market Design.
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However, single-dimensional auctions focus solely on the price and hence fail
to address issues related to the quality or the characteristics of the auctioned good.
This is particularly important in cases where the auctioned good is not a well defined
item, but instead it is a contract or a service in which cost or price is one of many
parameters. For example, in a contract for the construction of a piece of public in-
frastructure, the price of the project is a very important parameter but it should not
be the only one. In this case, the quality of the materials, the design and possible
effects on the people and the environment are serious factors that should be taken
into consideration when deciding the allocation1 of the contract. Likewise, in a e-
commerce application which for example may involve the purchase of web services,
often parameters such as bandwidth, responsiveness, or even the reliability of the
provider play a significant role with prospective clients not necessarily aiming for
the cheapest service.
Against this background, Che in his seminal paper [1] has designed a series of
auctions (first score, second score and second preferred score) to address the cases
where the quality of a product is of equal importance to its cost. In these auctions,
the suppliers report the quality of the item they are asked to provide and the costs
involved in its production at the reported quality, which the mechanism maps into a
single dimensional quantity, named as ’score’. All three auctions incentivise agents
to truthfully report their costs, and result to an equal expected utility for the buyer,
under the assumption that costs are independently distributed. This assumption was
relaxed by Branco [2] who introduced a two-stage optimal multi-dimensional auction
in a setting in which there was correlation among suppliers’ costs. Bogetoft and
Nielsen [5] propose more complex cost structures through the introduction of Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA [6, 7]) based competition. In this mechanism, and as
opposed to second score auctions, all agents’ bids determine the winner’s payment.
Now, references to multi-dimensional auctions can be found in literature related
to Computer Science and in particular multi-agent systems and e-commerce [8]. In
particular, Bichler in [9] after comparing single and multi-dimensional auctions in an
experimental web-based setting, showed that multi-dimensional auctions resulted in
significant higher utility which paves the way for possible e-commerce applications.
Furthermore, Beil and Wein [3] propose an iterative mechanism in which the buyer
sequentially estimates each bidder’s cost function through a series of score auctions.
However, they assume that agents are truthful and hence do not address strategic
behaviour. Parkes and Kalagnanam [4] propose an iterative multi-attribute procure-
ment price-based auction in which suppliers at each round submit their bids and a
winner which maximises the buyer’s preference is selected. They show that their
mechanism terminates with an outcome of modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves alloca-
tion. Furthermore, multi-dimensional auctions can also be applied in settings where
multiple suppliers can satisfy the principal’s demand [10], although this exceeds the
scope of this paper.
1 A typical example is the European Union which has introduced a procurement directive
based on two criteria: best economic value and lowest cost[11]. Examples include other
government authorities, such as the US Department of Defense [1].
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However, in all the above approaches there is a rather significant underlying as-
sumption. It is assumed that the principal will enforce through the use of external
and artificial means that the suppliers will report their truthful qualities. The above
papers either do not include in their models the possibility of the participating agents
having control on their reported qualities, or explicitly mention that the auction will
be canceled, or an extremely heavy fine will be issued to the winner of the auction if
the observed quality deviates from the reported one. We find this un-systematic ap-
proach to be unrealistic for most cases. For example, in state procurement auctions
the government will face public scrutiny if an obviously incompetent supplier is se-
lected and there may be a cost in the repetition of the auction, while in e-commerce
a web content provider who fails to secure the required resource by its suppliers and
consequently deliver it to its clients will lose credibility. In both cases, it is more im-
portant to create incentives that will motivate the suppliers to report their true quality
and based on that for the buyer to decide, instead of canceling the auction or de-
stroying the supplier in case there is a deviation between the reported and observed
values.
It is this challenge we address in this paper through the design of two mecha-
nisms, which initially allocate the contract to a specific supplier, while they guar-
antee that the suppliers reported their true qualities and costs through an additional
payment after the contract is fulfilled and the outcome is observed. In more detail, in
this paper we extend the state of the art in the following ways:
• We present a procurement mechanism in which the principal issues a two-step
payment. The principal initially asks the agents to report their cost and qual-
ity, and based on these reports selects a single agent to allocate the contract of
providing a service. The selected agent receives an initial payment based on its
reports. After that agent fulfils its contract by providing a service at a specific
quality which is observed by the principal, the principal issues an additional pay-
ment. The second payment balances between possible misreporting of quality in
the beginning of the mechanism and the actual production in the final step of the
mechanism.
• We introduce a second mechanism in which the principal issues an asymmetric
second payment based only on the deviation between the reported and produced
qualities. The agents producing more than they reported receive a positive pay-
ment, while those producing less than they reported receive a negative payment.
• We prove that for both our mechanisms truthful revelation of qualities and costs
is a dominant and a weakly dominant strategy respectively and that they are im-
mune to the combined misreporting of both qualities and costs. We also show
that both mechanisms are individually rational. Finally, we show that both mech-
anisms result to optimal payments for the winning agent, equal to the optimal
payment the agent receives in the standard second score auction. That is, the
principal can elicit the agents’ true qualities, without facing additional costs and
without relying on artificial means (such as terminating the auction).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the no-
tation and describe our setting in detail, while in Section 3 we discuss the tradi-
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tional second score auction in order to provide some necessary background in multi-
dimensional auctions. In Section 4 we introduce, analyse our mechanism and provide
the proofs of its economic properties, while in Section 5 we introduce the asymmet-
ric payments extension. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and provide our future
work.
1.2 The Context
We now introduce and describe our setting in more detail. We consider a principal
interested in procuring a project, a service or an item from one of n rational and risk
neutral agents, i ∈ I = {1, . . . n}. The project depends on multiple parameters (e.g.
bandwidth, latency, space in a data storage Cloud application). The parameters of
a project undertaken by agent i are defined by an s-dimensional vector of qualities
yi ∈ Rs0. To simplify the analysis, and without lose of generality, we assume that for
each agent the parameters of its service can be aggregated in one variable. Hence,
each agent has a single quality profile denoted by yi. In line with existing literature
[1, 2], we assume that the agents have a prior knowledge of their quality, which as
opposed to existing literature, may choose to misreport to the principal if they expect
to increase their utility by doing so. The true quality is unknown to the principal,
who does not have any means of verifying it before the fulfilment of the project.
Therefore, the principal makes its decision based on the report of the agent.
Furthermore, agents are capable of producing different levels of qualities, but
in order to produce the quality yi agent i needs inputs. These inputs represent the
cost in production and depend on each agent’s efficiencies. The costs are private
information to each agent and cannot be verified by any third party (i.e. the principal
or other agents). The cost agent i faces in the production of its quality is modeled
as a function of quality yi and can be denoted as xi(yi, ci), where ci represents the
agent’s private information about the cost of the project. We assume that the cost
function is increasing in both quality and cost parameter and that is convex regarding
the quality. These assumptions are realistic in all cases where we expect diminishing
returns as the quality increases, for example due to limitations in production methods
where significant resources are demanded for a small increase in production. Finally,
while agents are aware of their cost parameters, the principal has only access to their
distribution. We assume that ci is independently and identically distributed over [c, c]
with 0 < c < c < +∞ according to a distribution with positive and continuously
differentiable density function.
1.3 The Standard Second Score Auction
As previously mentioned, the second score auction has been widely used in order to
procure goods or services while taking into consideration both price and quality, as
opposed to standard auctions (i.e. English, Vickrey auctions) which focus solely on
the prices. Despite this dual nature of the second score auctions, they only consider
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agents’ strategic behaviour with respect to their reported costs and not their reported
qualities. They rely on the assumption that the auction will either be canceled, or
the winner of the auction will face an extremely heavy fine if the promised quality
is not delivered. Before we proceed to the analysis of our mechanisms which relax
this assumption through a more rational and systematic approach, we provide the
essential background for the understanding of the second score auction.
A second score auction maps the multi-dimensional bid (costs and qualities) into
a single-dimensional variable (score). Effectively, for agent i: (xi, yi) 7→ Si(xi, yi),
with Si = V (yi) − xi(yi, ci), where V (.) is the principal’s value function. The
value function is modeled as an increasing and concave function of the quality. The
interpretation of the above process is that an agent is willing to produce yi if its paid
at least xi, with the principal’s satisfaction is measured to be V (yi).
The mechanism proceeds as follows:
1. Principal asks n agents to submit their cost-quality bids (x̂i, ŷi) with i ∈
{1, ..., n}
2. Each bid is assigned with a score Ŝi = S(x̂i, ŷi) = V (ŷi)− x̂i.
3. The agent with the highest score wins the auction and is allocated the project2.
4. The winner agent receives its payment by the principal: P̂(1) = V (ŷ(1))− Ŝ(2),
with subscripts (1) and (2) representing the winner and runner-up agent respec-
tively.
In order to demonstrate how this mecanism works, let us consider a buisness
owner who is interested in profesional web presence. The candidate firms have re-
ceived a list with the specifications she requires i.e. bandwidth, storage and CPU
availability, access to multiple email accounts etc3. We assume that she has re-
ceived three offers and that the corresponding bids are (72.9, 9), (16, 4), (224, 16)
where the first element is the provider’s cost denoted by x(y) = ci ∗ y2 with
ci = {0.9, 1, 0.875}. If her value function is V (y) = 50 ∗
√
(y) + 25 then the
corresponding scores will be Si = {102.1, 109, 1}. The second offer will be chosen
and the payment will be equal to 125− 102.1 = 22.9.
The above mechanism has some very important properties. Most notably, truth-
ful revelation of costs is a dominant strategy. Second, the mechanism is individually
rational as it is easy to prove that the utility of the winner agent is always larger
or equal (in case of tie-break) to 0. Finally, the optimal outcome maximises the so-
cially efficient one, since the winner agent is the agent with the highest social wel-
fare: V (y(1))−x(1) given that the mechanism is incentive compatible regarding cost
and truthful reporting of the quality is assumed (the auction is canceled and a harsh
penalty is issued to those who do not achieve the reported quality).
2 Ties are ignored, although standard practices (i.e. random selection) may be applied. Che
suggests in his paper that a random tie-breaking rule does not affect the expected payment
in equilibrium [1].
3 We also assume that all these specifications can be aggregated into one quantity (referred
as quality).
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1.4 A Mechanism for Eliciting Both Costs and Outputs
We now relax the assumption regarding the guaranteed truthful reporting of quali-
ties. In doing so, the principal faces the challenge of having to address an additional
element of strategic behaviour on behalf of the agent. Indeed, in addition to mis-
reporting its cost, now the agent can manipulate the principal by not delivering the
promised quality.
We address the above challenge by designing a mechanism based on a two-step
payment in order to create incentives which promote truthful reporting of both costs
and qualities without relying on artificial means (i.e. cancellation of the auction). The
proposed mechanism balances between two equally important concepts. That is, the
agent must receive a reward for its actual production, while penalised for a possible
misreporting of its costs and qualities.
Against this background, initially a standard second score auction is implemented
in order to allocate the project to a specific agent who also receives its first pay-
ment. After the principal observes the actual outcome, secondary payment is issued
to the selected agent. The first part of this additional payment consists of a symmetric
penalty for the agent deviating from its reported quality, while in the second part it
receives a compensation for its actual production.
In more detail the mechanism proceeds as follows:
1. Principal asks n agents to submit their cost-quality bids (x̂i, ŷi) with i ∈
{1, ..., n}.
2. Each bid is assigned with a score Ŝi = S(x̂i, ŷi) = V (ŷi)− x̂i.
3. The agent with the highest score wins the auction and is allocated the project.
4. The winner agent receives its first payment by the principal: P̂(1) = V (ŷ(1))−
Ŝ(2).
5. Winning agent produces quality y(1) (not necessarily equal to ŷ(1)).
6. Principal observes winning agent’s quality production and issues the second
payment:
B(ŷ(1), y1) = d(ŷ(1), y1)× [V (ŷ(1))− Ŝ(2)] + [V (y(1))− Ŝ(2)] (1.1)
where d(ŷ(1), y1) is the function that measures the effect of winner’s misreport-
ing and consequently the amount of the initial payment the agent has to return
back. In the following section we discuss the properties such a function should
have and we proceed to define it.
1.4.1 Definition of d() function
The secondary payment consists of two parts. In the first part the principal penalises
the selected agent for a possible deviation between the reported and produced qual-
ity, while in the second part the selected agent receives a payment for its actual
production. The d() function is designed to guarantee that the selected agent will be
penalised for not being able to meet its initial claims. The penalty is symmetric, that
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is the selected agent is penalised for its misreporting even if its misreporting results
to an increase of the principal’s value (through over-production). This will be nec-
essary for applications in which over-production has negative effect. For example,
over-production may be unwanted due to limitations in storage or transport capacity,
or market conditions (over-supply). Alternatively, there may be more complex cases
where agents may have to provide costly estimates of their qualities. In these cases, it
will be unacceptable if the same amount of misreporting resulted to a different type
of payment (i.e. penalty vs reward).
Therefore, the properties we seek in d() function are the following:
1. The first part of the payment must be a penalty, hence d() must be negative for
every ŷ(1) ∈ [0,+∞).
2. The penalty must be proportional of the misreporting, that is minor deviation
should result to a minor penalty, with the penalty increasing as misreporting
increases.
3. There should be no distinction between agents which under or over reported their
qualities, hence function d() must be symmetrical.
4. The secondary payment must be maximised at truthful reporting ŷ(1) = y(1) in
order to guarantee incentives.
A function which satisfies the above assumption is the following4:
d(ŷ(1), y(1)) = −
[
(ŷ(1) − y(1))2
y2(1)
]
− 1 (1.2)
1.4.2 Proof of Economic Properties
Having described in detail the mechanism, we now identify and prove its economic
properties. Specifically we show that:
1. Truthful revelation of agents’ qualities is a dominant strategy.
2. Truthful revelation of agents’ costs is a weakly dominant strategy.
3. The mechanism is immune to combined strategic behaviour of both qualities and
costs.
4. The mechanism is individually rational.
5. The optimal payment is equal to the optimal payment of a standard second score
auction mechanism.
Lemma 1 Truthful revelation of the agents’ qualities is a dominant strategy given
that they truthfully reported their costs.
4 We are aware that the choice of the d() function appears to be arbitrary. It should be noted
that a more complicated analysis of the function exceeds the scope of this paper. This
analysis will be central in future work where we consider agents facing costs in the process
of identifying their qualities.
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Proof. We prove that truthful revelation of agents’ qualities is a dominant strategy
by showing that winner’s utility is maximised at truthful reporting (i.e. ŷ(1) = y(1)).
The winning5 agent’s utility6 is equal to:
U(ŷ) = V (ŷ)− S2 + d(ŷ)[V (ŷ)− S2] + V (y)− S2 − x(y) (1.3)
With its derivative being equal to:
U ′(ŷ) = [1 + d(ŷ)]V ′(ŷ) + d′(ŷ)[V (ŷ)− S2] (1.4)
For ŷ = y and given that d(y) = −1 and d′(y) = 0 the derivative is equal to 0.
The second derivative for the utility function is:
U ′′(ŷ) = d′(ŷ)V ′(ŷ) + [1 + d(ŷ)]V ′′(ŷ) + d′′(ŷ)[V (ŷ)− S2] + d′(ŷ)V ′(ŷ) (1.5)
For ŷ = y and given that d(y) = −1 and d′(y) = 0 the second derivative is
equal to U ′′(y) = d′′(y)[V (y) − S2] which is negative given that d′′(y) < 0 and
V (y) − S2 > 0. Regarding V (y) − S2, for a selected agent who has truthfully
reported its cost: S1 = V (y) − x(y) > S2 ⇒ V (y) > S2. Finally, the selected
agent’s utility is equal to S1 − S2 which positive (unless there is a tie between the
first and second agent’s scores). uunionsq
Lemma 2 Truthful revelation of the agents’ costs is a weakly dominant strategy
given that they truthfully reported their qualities.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Let x and y be an agent’s true cost and quality,
and S the score that corresponds to these true values, while x̂, ŷ, Ŝ the reported ones.
Furthermore, let x2, y2, S2 be the bids and score of the runner up agent (i.e. Ŝ > S2).
First, let the agent’s misreporting have an effect on the outcome of the auction.
We consider the following two cases:
1. Agent wins by misreporting while it would have lost if truthful.
2. Agent loses by misreporting while it would have won if truthful.
• In Case (1) agent reports its cost s.t Ŝ > S2 given that S < S2. The agent
achieves this by reporting a lower cost than its actual one i.e. x̂ < x. Under
optimal reporting of quality, the utility of an agent misreporting its cost in Case
(1) will be negative i.e. U(y) = V (y)− x(y)− S2 = S − S2 < 0.
• In Case (2) agent reports its cost s.t. Ŝ < S2 given that S > S2. The agent would
have won the auction, but instead reports a cost greater than its actual one i.e.
x̂ > x. As a result, the agent loses the auction and consequently receives zero
utility.
5 From this point we omit subscript (1) for notational convenience
6 After the actual quality y has been observed, function d(by, y) can be simplified to d(by),
since by is the only unknown variable.
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Second, we assume that the agent misreports its cost without this affecting
whether he wins the auction or not. If the agent had already lost the auction, mis-
reporting would have no additional effect given that the utility would be zero. Had
the agent already won the auction, misreporting would not result to additional bene-
fits. Specifically, both payments depend on the second lower score and the reported
and actually produced (for the second stage) quality. uunionsq
Theorem 1 The mechanism is immune to combined misreporting of both qualities
and costs.
Proof. In the above proofs we showed that truthful reporting of quality is an opti-
mal strategy if the agent reports truthfully its cost, and that the same holds for an
agent’s costs, given that it truthfully reported its quality. However, given the multi-
dimensional nature of the bids an agent could attempt to manipulate the principal
by misreporting both costs and qualities. Specifically, we consider these two general
cases:
1. Agent wins the auction by misreporting both its quality and cost
2. Agent wins the auction with the misreporting having no effect on the auction’s
outcome
3. Agent loses the auction despite or due to its misreporting
• In Case (1) the agent reports its quality and cost s.t. Ŝ > S2, while S < S2. For
example, an agent may be inclined to report both lower cost and higher quality
than its true values in order to guarantee that it will win the auction. Let an agent’s
reported quality be ŷ = ky with k ∈ [0,+∞) being the coefficient of under-
reporting (k ≤ 1) or over-reporting (k > 1), while the reported cost remains x̂.
The utility derived by that agent is:
U = V (ky)− S2 − [(k − 1)2 + 1][V (ky)− S2] + V (y)− S2 − x(y)⇒
U = −(k − 1)2[V (ky)− S2] + S1 − S2
Now since the agent misreported both its cost and quality and won the auction
while it should not have won k 6= 1, S < S2 and Ŝ > S2 the above expression
is negative given that Ŝ = V (ky) − x̂(ky) > S2 ⇒ V (ky) > S2. This type of
combined misreporting leads to negative utility.
• In Case (2) the agent would have won the auction anyway, and although misre-
porting of cost and quality will have no impact on the outcome of the auction, it
may have on the secondary payment. In this case, S > S2, and although it is pos-
sible that U > 0, we know from Lemma 1 that the agent’s utility is maximised at
ŷ = y if V (y)− S2 > 0. Now, given that in this case the agent has already won
the auction: S−S2 = V (y)−x(y)−S2 > 0⇒ V (y)−S2 > 0. So misreporting
would deviate from the optimal outcome.
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• In Case (3) the agent does not win the auction after misreporting its cost and
quality. This may have happened as a result of the misreporting (the agent would
have won otherwise), or despite the misreporting. In both those cases, the utility
the agent will receive will be equal to zero.
We have showed that combined misreporting of both costs and qualities leads ei-
ther to negative utility or to a non-optimal outcome, hence the mechanism is immune
to this type of strategic behaviour. uunionsq
Theorem 2 The mechanism is individual rational
Proof. We have shown in the above proofs that for truthful reporting of qualities the
selected agent’s utility is equal to V (y) − S2 − x(y), which is positive for truthful
reporting of costs. This is also the optimal payment the agent receives for reporting
its true cost and quality in the standard second score auction. It can be seen, that
the principal can elicit agents’ true quality without additional cost on its behalf and
without relying on artificial means such as cancellation of the auction. uunionsq
Corollary 1 The agent’s optimal payment for reporting its true cost and quality is
equal to the payment issued in a standard second score auction.
1.5 A Mechanism with asymmetric secondary payment
In the previous section, we introduced a mechanism in which the principal penalises
the winning agent for failing to provide the quality it reported. The principal does
not discriminate among those agents who under or over reported and balances the
fine with a fixed payment equal to the payment the agent would have received in the
original second score auction. We focused on the case where the principal’s primary
focus is the quality’s misreporting even if it ends up receiving value higher than it
initially expected. Although this may be necessary in several cases (i.e. limited stor-
age capacity, flooding of market through over-supply) or in more complex settings
(i.e. costly estimates of qualities), it is natural to assume that in a setting with no
special conditions or uncertainty regarding the quality, over-production should not
be penalised.
Against this background, in this section we introduce a mechanism in which the
principal does not directly penalise those agents who end up producing more than
they reported without necessarily incentivising them to do so. The principal still val-
ues truthful reporting the most, however it is not willing to equally penalise all agents
to achieve it. The first payment for this mechanism is identical to the first one, while
the secondary payment issued after the actual production, rewards a selected agent
which has produced a good or a service of quality higher than the one it reported
initially in the mechanism, while it issues a fine to a selected agent with the exact
opposite behaviour.
In more detail the payment issued by the principal after observing the agent’s
production y(1) (not necessarily equal to ŷ(1)), is the following:
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B(ŷ(1), y1) = d(ŷ(1), y1)× [V (y1)− V (ŷ(1))] (1.6)
where d(ŷ(1), y1) is the function that measures the effect of winner’s misreport-
ing. As opposed to Mechanism 1, in this mechanism function d() may reward an
agent even if it is misreporting its quality. In the following section we discuss the
design of this function and how the additional payment can be balanced in order to
guarantee incentives in this mechanism.
1.5.1 Definition of d() function
In this mechanism, the winner of the auction is not necessarily directly penalised
for choosing to produce a good at a different quality than the promised one. In this
case the selected agent will not be asked to return a part of its initial payment if the
principal has benefited from the agent’s misreporting. We take this into consideration
by designing d() function so that an agent will not be directly penalised for causing
an increase in principal’s value (through over producing), although it may still be
far from doing the best it can. Hence, it is important to differentiate between the
misreporting that inflicts losses and that one which causes gains for the principal. In
order to do so, function d() must have the following properties:
• For the agent who reported less than it produced and thus created a surplus,
ŷ ∈ [0, y]:
1. Given that V (y)− V (ŷ) > 0, d() must be positive for every ŷ ∈ [0, y] so the
secondary payment is in fact a reward.
2. The agent should receive a portion of the principal’s surplus V (y)− V (ŷ).
3. The agent should not be inclined to under-report systematically, hence it
should receive a small portion of that surplus for significant under-reporting.
** Hence, for ŷ ∈ [0, y], d(ŷ) should be an increasing and positive function
taking values in [0, 1].
• For the agent who reported more than it produced and thus created a deficit,
ŷ ∈ (y,+∞):
1. Given that V (y)− V (ŷ) < 0, d() must be positive for every ŷ ∈ (y,+∞) so
the secondary payment is in fact a penalty.
2. The agent’s penalty should increase as the principal’s deficit in quality
V (y) − V (ŷ) increases. The agent possibly manipulated the first payment
of the mechanism by reporting high quality, but it turned out it could not
deliver it.
3. The agent should not be over-penalised for a small amount of misreporting,
hence it should receive a fine proportional to the deficit of principal’s value.
** Hence, for ŷ ∈ (y,+∞), d(ŷ) should be an increasing and positive function
taking values in (1,+∞).
A function which satisfies all the above properties is:
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d(ŷ(1), y(1)) =
(ŷ(1) − y(1))3
y3(1)
+ 1 (1.7)
1.5.2 Proof of Economic Properties
Having described in detail the mechanism, we now identify and prove its economic
properties. Specifically we show that:
1. Truthful revelation of agents’ qualities is a dominant strategy.
2. Truthful revelation of agents’ costs is a weakly dominant strategy.
3. The mechanism is immune to combined strategic behaviour of both qualities and
costs.
4. The mechanism is individually rational.
5. The optimal payment is equal to the optimal payment of a standard second score
auction mechanism.
Lemma 3 Truthful revelation of agents’ qualities is a dominant strategy, given that
they truthfully reported their costs.
Proof. We prove that truthful revelation of agents’ qualities is a dominant strategy
by showing that winner’s utility is maximised at truthful reporting (i.e. ŷ(1) = y(1)
or after simplifying the notation ŷ = y).
The selected agent’s utility after the a project of quality y has been produced and
observed, is given by:
U(ŷ) = V (ŷ)− S2 + d(ŷ)[V (y)− V (ŷ)]− x(y) (1.8)
With its derivative being equal to:
U ′(ŷ) = [1− d(ŷ)]V ′(ŷ) + d′(ŷ)[V (y)− V (ŷ)] (1.9)
It is clear, that for ŷ = y and given that d(y) = 1 and d′(y) = 0 the derivative is
equal to 0.
The second derivative of the utility function is:
U ′′(ŷ) = [1− d(ŷ)]V ′′(ŷ) + d′′(ŷ)[V (y)− V (ŷ)]− 2d′(ŷ)V ′(ŷ) (1.10)
For ŷ = y and given that d(y) = 1 and d′(y) = d′′(y) = 0 the second derivative
is equal to 0], hence the second derivative test is inconclusive for the stationary point
y. We will show that y is a maximum point by examining the sign of the derivative
of the utility function for y ∈ [0,+∞). Indeed, for Equation 1.9 it can be said that
it is positive for ŷ ∈ [0, y], while it is negative for ŷ ∈ (y,+∞). Hence the utility
function is increasing in [0, y], while it is decreasing in (y,+∞). That is ŷ = y is
a maximum point with U(y) = S1 − S2 > 0 (unless there is a tie), hence truthful
revelation of agents’ reported quality is a dominant strategy. uunionsq
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Lemma 4 Truthful revelation of agents’ reported costs is a weakly dominant strat-
egy given that they truthfully reports their qualities.
Proof. The proof for this theorem is identical to the proof of Lemma 2. Despite
the fact that in this mechanism there is a different secondary payment, under optimal
reporting of quality, the agent derives an identical utility, equal to V (y)−S2−x(y) =
S−S2, where St is the score that corresponds to truthful reporting of quality and its
cost. uunionsq
Theorem 3 The mechanism is immune to combined misreporting of both qualities
and costs.
Proof. In the above proofs we showed that truthful reporting of quality is an opti-
mal strategy if the agent reports truthfully its cost, and that the same holds for an
agent’s costs, given that it truthfully reported its quality. However, given the multi-
dimensional nature of the bids an agent could attempt to manipulate the principal by
misreporting both costs and qualities. An additional complication appears given that
there may be a positive secondary payment for a ŷ∗ ∈ [0, y], and hence it is important
to determine whether it is possible for an agent to manipulate the reporting of costs
early in the mechanism in order to guarantee positive secondary payment. We still
consider the two following general cases:
• Agent wins the auction by misreporting both its quality and its cost
• Agent wins the auction with the misreporting having no effect on the auction’s
outcome.
• Agent loses the auction despite or due to its misreporting
• In Case (1) agent reports both its quality and cost s.t. Ŝ > S2, while S < S2.
Let y∗ = k∗y, with k∗ being the coefficient of under-reporting (k∗ ≤ 1) or over-
reporting (k∗ > 1), with k∗y maximising the secondary payment B(ŷ, y) (but
not the overall agent’s utility). The utility derived by that agent is:
U = V (k∗y)− S2 + [(k∗ − 1)3 + 1][V (y)− V (k∗y)]]− x(y)⇒
U = [S − S2] + [(k∗ − 1)3[V (y)− V (k∗y)]]
Now since the agent misreported both its cost and quality and won the auction
while it should not have won the above expression is negative. Indeed S−S2 < 0
and [(k∗ − 1)3[V (y)− V (k∗y)]] < 0 for both k∗ < 1 and k∗ > 1
• In Case (2) the agent would have won the auction anyway and its possible mis-
reporting of quality and cost had no impact on that outcome. It is important now
to examine whether it is still in an agents best interest to report y∗. In this case,
S − S2 > 0, and [(k∗ − 1)3[V (y)− V (k∗y)]] < 0. Although, it may be possible
that U > 0, we know from Lemma 3 that the utility will be maximised at k = 1.
Hence, it will not be optimal for an agent not to report its true quality, given that
it will end up receiving less for misreporting.
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• In Case (3) the agent does not win the auction after misreporting its cost and
quality. This loss may have happened due or despite the agent’s misreporting and
a result of it the utility it will receive will be equal to zero.
We have showed that combined misreporting of both costs and qualities leads either
to negative utility or to a non-optimal outcome, hence the mechanism is immune to
this type of strategic behaviour. uunionsq
Theorem 4 The mechanism is individual rational
Proof. We have shown in the above proofs that for truthful reporting of qualities the
selected agent’s utility is equal to V (y) − S2 − x(y), which is positive for truthful
reporting of costs. This is also the optimal payment the agent receives for reporting
its true cost and quality in the standard second score auction. It can be seen, that
the principal can elicit agents’ true quality without additional cost on its behalf and
without relying on artificial means such as cancellation of the auction. uunionsq
Corollary 2 The agent’s optimal payment for reporting its true cost and quality is
equal to the payment issued in a standard second score auction.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced two novel multi-dimensional mechanisms based on a
two-step payment in a setting in which the principal cannot enforce truthful reporting
of agents’ qualities through artificial means such as the cancellation of the auction
or extremely high fines. Initially, the principal procures an item or a service from the
winner of a standard second score auction and it issues a second score auction pay-
ment based on that agent’s reported quality and cost. That agent then fulfils its part
of the contract and produces an output of a certain quality. The principal, after hav-
ing observed the production, calculates a second payment based on both the selected
agent’s reported and produced quality.
Regarding the secondary payment, in the first mechanism it consists of two parts.
In the first part the principal issues a symmetric penalty to the selected agent for
misreporting its quality, while in the second part it compensates that agent through a
standard second score auction payment based on the agent’s produced quality and not
its reported. In the second mechanism, the principal issues an asymmetric payment
to the selected agent. That is, it rewards that agent if the procured service is of higher
quality to the reported one, while it penalises it for the exact opposite. Despite the
different approaches, under truthful reporting both mechanisms result to the same
total payment which is equal to payment issued to the winner of the standard second
auction. Hence, there is no cost in the principal’s attempt to guarantee incentives
regarding the agents’ reported qualities, and therefore no reason at all for enforcing
them upon the agents.
For both mechanisms we provided proofs of their economic properties. Specifi-
cally, we showed that they are incentive compatible regarding the reported qualities
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(dominant strategy) and costs (weakly dominant strategy) and individually rational.
In addition to this, we showed that they are immune to agents’ combined misreport-
ing of their parameters.
In our future work we intend to consider a setting in which the agents are not
aware of their specific quality. Agents will only have a probabilistic estimate of their
production and based on that estimate the principal will have to make a decision.
Agents will face costs in the generation of their estimates and hence they will have
to balance between the amount of resources they will invest on generating their es-
timate and the consequences they may face for providing imprecise or inaccurate
estimates. By addressing these issues, we will be able to apply this mechanism in
more complex and dynamical domains where there is uncertainty regarding the pro-
duction. A typical example is the production of electricity through specific renewable
sources which depend on weather conditions (i.e. solar, wind power) and hence sub-
ject to forecasting. In this case the principal will have to elicit truthful and precise
estimates, while the focus of the mechanism remains on the actual production. Also,
costs involved in both the estimate and production will have to be balanced so that the
whole process is a viable option for both the principal and the participating agents.
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